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Abstract: Despite the large amount of research conducted in this area over the last two decades, comorbidity of psychiat-
ric disorders remains a topic of major practical and theoretical significance. 
Official diagnostic and therapeutic guidelines of psychiatric disorders still do not provide clinicians and researchers with 
any treatment-specific indications for those cases presenting with psychiatric comorbidity. We will discuss the diagnostic 
improvement brought about, in clinical practice, by the punctual and refined recognition of threshold and subthreshold 
comorbidity. From such a perspective, diagnostic procedures and forthcoming systems of classification of mental disor-
ders should attempt to combine descriptive, categorical and dimensional approaches, addressing more attention to the 
cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of nuclear, subclinical, and atypical symptoms that may represent a pattern of ei-
ther full-blown or partially expressed psychiatric comorbidity. This should certainly be regarded as a positive develop-
ment. Parallel, continuous critical challenge seems to be vital in this area, in order to prevent dangerous trivializations and 
misunderstandings. 
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COMORBIDITY 
TOWARDS DSM-V 
Despite the large amount of research conducted in this 
area over the last two decades, comorbidity of psychiatric 
disorders remains a topic of major practical and theoretical 
significance [1-4]. As more systematic attention has been 
devoted to psychiatric diagnosis in general, psychiatric co-
morbidity has imposed increasing consideration, and the 
high frequency of multiple diagnoses has discredited the 
popular assumption in the 70’ and 80’ [5, 6] that a particular 
patient is unlikely to have more than one disorder. However, 
even after its fine-tuning through successive editions, the 
current edition, DSM-IV [7], represents only a fraction of 
clinical reality. In DSM-IV-TR [8], clinicians find categories 
defined appropriately by descriptive, observable definitions; 
they also find that the boundaries of any given category are 
an inadequate match with the patients they treat. Within this 
context, the presence of Axis I and II psychiatric comorbid-
ity and the frequent presentation of atypical and subclinical 
symptoms are probable major reasons for failure to match 
patients with the DSM-IV’s discrete, categorical, prototypes 
of mental illness.  
Given the short history of the term comorbidity, there are 
a surprisingly large number of definitions. Feinstein [9] 
coined the term comorbidity to mean “any distinct additional 
clinical entity that has existed or that may occur during the 
clinical course of a patient who has the index disease under 
study.” Strictly speaking, use of the term is restricted to dis-
eases or disorders, not symptoms. Symptoms can associate  
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or co-occur, but they are not comorbid with disorders or with 
each other. In psychiatric epidemiology, the term comorbid 
is used somewhat differently, the emphasis being on relative 
risk. When a patient has a particular index disorder, there 
may be a relatively greater or lesser risk of other disorders 
being diagnosed or other symptoms observed. 
Clinical studies also use the concept of comorbidity in 
the sense that more than one disorder can be diagnosed in the 
same individual. In addition, any individual who meets the 
full diagnostic criteria for only one disorder may still have an 
increased frequency of symptoms from other categories, but 
to an extent that is insufficient to diagnose another disorder. 
Diagnostic studies may identify symptoms or relationships 
between syndromes that improve diagnostic precision by 
increasing the discriminant power of diagnostic criteria. 
Kaplan and Feinstein [10] also introduced a number of 
distinctions about types of comorbidity to clarify the con-
cepts of comorbidity that arise in medicine in general and, 
possibly, in psychiatry. They distinguished between patho-
genic, diagnostic, and prognostic comorbidity. Pathogenic 
comorbidity arises when a particular disease leads to certain 
other complications or diseases, which are therefore consid-
ered to be etiologically related. Diagnostic comorbidity is 
likely whenever diagnostic criteria are based on patterns of 
symptoms that are individually nonspecific. Disorders that 
predispose the patient to develop other disorders have prog-
nostic comorbidity. 
It is often difficult to distinguish these subtypes of co-
morbidity, however, unless the pathogenesis of the disorder 
is well understood, which rarely happens with psychiatric 
disorders. The proper terminology—comorbidity versus 
some other word or phrase—is not unanimously accepted. 
George Winokur [11], for example, preferred co-syndromal 
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or use of the primary–secondary distinction over comorbid. 
The multiple uses of the primary– secondary distinction have 
been further discussed extensively in Maser et al. [12]. In 
medical terms, comorbidity conveys, at least in part, the no-
tion of a disease process. Disease is produced by pathogens, 
but despite the suspicion of many, as said before, there are 
very few pathogens known to underlie the mental disorders 
described in DSM-IV. Co-syndromal is a more technically 
accurate term, and the temporal definition of the primary–
secondary distinction has value. We could also use the term 
co-occurrence or concomitance or, more simply, association. 
Notwithstanding, in line with current usage, we shall con-
tinue with the term comorbid in relation to mental illnesses, 
even when there is no known pathogen. 
In psychiatry, comorbidity appears to be the rule rather 
than the exception. Numerous studies of clinical samples of 
inpatients and outpatients [13-17] have evidenced the large 
proportion of patients who simultaneously meet diagnostic 
criteria for more than a single disorder, both within axis I 
and between axes I and II of the DSM-III-R [18]. Similarly, 
multiple diagnoses within individual subjects appear to be 
quite frequent in epidemiological surveys conducted in the 
general population [19-21]. 
Two major approaches have been employed to classify 
multiple diagnoses within a single individual: (1) assignment 
of a primary and secondary diagnosis based on order of on-
set; and (2) application of hierarchical diagnostic systems in 
which one condition is inferred to supersede the other. The 
former approach is preferable because no preconceived etio-
logical assumptions regarding the relationships between dis-
orders are necessary. However, the primary–secondary dis-
tinction may be difficult to apply to the assignment of retro-
spectively ascertained lifetime diagnoses, which require ac-
curate determination of the age of onset of disorders that 
often emerge in an insidious manner. The latter approach has 
not been applied consistently across studies because of dif-
ference in the hierarchical structure of the diagnostic systems 
employed. Moreover, hierarchical relationships may often 
belie clinical data. The elimination of hierarchical relation-
ships between many of the disorders in the DSM-III-R [18] 
criteria facilitated the assessment of relationships between 
two or more disorders. 
Within this framework, it is plausible that we will not see 
substantial changes in the forthcoming DSM-V 
(http://www.dsm5.org). More emphasis will be certainly 
given to a dimensional characterization for each individual 
diagnosis. In other words, in the DSM-V it will be partially 
acknowledged the potential utility of incorporating dimen-
sional elements into our diagnostic classification systems. 
However, no strong proposals are likely to emerge with re-
gard to exactly how dimensional classification will interface 
with DSM classical diagnostic approach.  In particular, we 
will see the introduction of dimensional severity ratings to 
the extant diagnostic categories and/or the constituent symp-
tom criteria. Compared to more drastic approaches (e.g., 
multi-dimensional assessment, in which categorical diagnos-
tic labels are subsequently imposed on the basis of quantita-
tive algorithms),  the “severity” specifiers introduced in the 
DSM-V for most anxiety and mood disorders would be rela-
tively practical because the categorical system would remain 
intact and the dimensional rating system could be optional in 
settings where its implementation is less feasible (e.g., pri-
mary care).  
Several potential advantages of this ‘not-full’ dimen-
sional approach were noted including the ability to address 
key shortcomings and sources of unreliability in the DSM, 
such as its failure to convey disorder severity as well as other 
clinically significant features that are either subsumed by 
other disorders (e.g., GAD in mood disorders and PTSD) or 
fall just below conventional thresholds due to a DSM techni-
cality (e.g., subclinical or NOS diagnoses where the clinical 
presentation is a symptom or two short of a formal disorder). 
Moreover, because the dimensional ratings would be added 
to the current diagnostic categories, this approach would 
have other advantages including: (a) its basis on a pre-
existing and widely studied set of constructs; and (b) the 
ability to retain functional analytic and temporal (duration) 
aspects of diagnosis that are difficult to capture in a purely 
psychometric approach (See Table 1 below).  
Such an approach will provide a standardized assessment 
system that would foster across-site comparability in the 
study of dimensional models of psychopathology. Therefore, 
this approach could be regarded as a prudent “first step” in 
the direction of the feasibility of more ambitious dimensional 
systems.  
Nonetheless, the DSM-V initial proposal is not without 
immediately apparent limitations. For instance, as noted ear-
lier, “difference in patient report” (i.e., patient gives different 
information to independent interviewers in response to in-
quiries about the presence, severity, or duration of symp-
toms) is a very common source of diagnostic unreliability 
that would be relevant to dimensional clinical assessment. In 
fact, because the dimensional ratings would simply be added 
onto the existing criteria sets, most sources of unreliability 
present in the current diagnostic system would continue to be 
germane (e.g., measurement error associated with vaguely 
operationalized symptom criteria and differential diagnosis 
decision rules; see GAD example in preceding paragraph). 
Perhaps more importantly, because the various disorder 
categories would remain unchanged, a dimensional system 
of this nature would not address the problem of high diag-
nostic comorbidity. 
II. THRESHOLD AND SUBTHRESHOLD COMOR-
BIDITY 
During the last two decades, most epidemiological and 
clinical studies on comorbidity, focused on “threshold” co-
morbidities; that is, the coexistence of two or more DSM-IV 
Axis I disorders in the same individual in a defined period of 
time (lifetime, 6 months, 1 month).  
Table 1. Rationale for Severity Measure for Panic Disorder* 
Panic Disorder Severity Scale-Self Report 
Seven items rated on 0-4 severity scales: panic attack frequency, panic 
attack distress, anticipatory anxiety, agoraphobic avoidance, interocep-
tive avoidance, work/home impairment, and social impairment. 
*From the proposed revision section for Panic Disorder (http://www.dsm5.org 
/ProposedRevision) 
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In spite of the large amount of studies, it is still unclear 
whether the co-occurrence of two or more mental disorders 
in the same person reflects the presence of pathophysiologi-
cally independent entities. 
High levels of comorbidity raise questions about the 
specificity and the boundaries of certain diagnostic catego-
ries and provide important clues to the etiology, pathophysi-
ology, and phenomenology of both the index and comorbid 
disorders. Klein and Riso [22] argued that there are at least 
four theoretical models of comorbidity that may explain the 
simultaneous co-occurrence of two or more mental disorders 
in the same individual: comorbidity due to sampling bias, 
artifacts of diagnostic criteria, drawing boundaries in the 
wrong place, and common etiological relationships (see  
Table 2). The concept of comorbidity is a valid and impor-
tant clinical construct to capture and depict different compo-
nents of psychopathology. 
The amount of comorbidity may be influenced in differ-
ent ways. First, the exclusion of hierarchical rules in the 
classification of mental disorders and the separation of a 
more pervasive condition into more specific conditions may 
increase comorbidity rates. Second, the period of time 
through an individual’s lifespan when a disorder is present 
can affect comorbidity. Third, the definition of a threshold 
for a diagnosis may also sensitively affect levels of comor-
bidity as low threshold tends to increase prevalence rates, 
while high threshold tends to decrease prevalence rates. 
This issue becomes problematic when considering “sub-
threshold” comorbidities. Clinical correlates of subthreshold 
forms of anxiety and their relationship with other mental 
disorders have not, to our knowledge, been investigated sys-
tematically.  
Krueger and Marcon (2) supported a liability spectrum 
model of comorbidity. According to their theorization, spe-
cific mental disorders are understood as manifestations of 
latent liability factors that explain comorbidity by virtue of 
their impact on multiple disorders. This theory is based on 
application of modern statistical models to vast samples of 
individuals. Nevertheless, from a clinical perspective this 
approach is not so distant from reappraisals of older theori-
zations. For example, it was argued that in the majority of 
patients with a “neurotic syndrome,” symptoms drawn from 
two or more diagnostic categories on the basis of predomi-
nant features would often be found. In such cases, the diag-
nostic groups may overlap or fade into another. Therefore, 
neurotic disorders have been hypothesized to occur generally 
among individuals who show deviations along a number of 
independent dimensions, which may predispose them to 
anxiety, obsessive symptoms, or depressive disorders, as 
well as other emotional disorders. In many cases, it may be 
difficult to disentangle the specific components of such neu-
rotic syndromes [23]. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF SPECTRUM APPROACH 
FOR COMORBIDITY 
The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of classifying 
many patients with multiple disorders into one of the DSM 
categories has spawned a variety of other procedures to cope 
with clinical reality. These include use of the primary–
secondary distinction, multiple diagnoses, use of both axes I 
and II, associated features of a disorder, and the spectrum of 
a disorder concept [24-28]. The term spectrum has been tra-
ditionally used to underlie relationships among clusters of 
symptoms or to place defined syndromes in relation to one 
another. In the 90’s, the “Spectrum Model” of psychiatric 
disorders evolved (initially with the “panic-agoraphobic 
spectrum”) at the University of Pisa, and has been further 
developed in collaboration with researchers from the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh and elsewhere in the United States 
(www.spectrum-project.org) [29]. In a broader way, such a 
Model can bring coherence to complex psychiatric symp-
toms, and include: (1) core, atypical, and subclinical symp-
toms of the primary axis I disorder; (2) signs, isolated symp-
toms, symptom cluster, and behavioural patterns related to 
the core symptoms that may be prodromal, may represent a 
precursor of a not-yet fully expressed condition, or may be 
sequelae of a previously full-fledged disorder; and (3) tem-
peramental and/or personality traits. . This approach has the 
potential to answer to various problems that arise by splitting 
disorders into narrow, distinct, nonoverlapping diagnostic 
entities, like: (1) failure to encompass subthreshold and 
atypical symptomatology; (2) artificial enhancement of co-
morbid diagnosis; and (3) failure to replicate genetic markers 
of narrow, restrictive phenotypes. Furthermore, the spectrum 
approach gives clinical weight to low-severity and isolated 
symptoms that either appear alone or occur concomitantly 
with a major disorder [30-33].  
Spectrum symptomatology may be viewed as the part of 
the iceberg that is hidden beneath the surface of the water, 
while the core, diagnostic criteria symptoms represent the 
obvious, visible portion. Of course, the various conditions 
may evidence substantial overlap in terms of individual 
symptoms, and symptoms of mood spectrum may overlap 
with anxiety disorders spectrum symptoms [34, 35], sub-
stance abuse [36], as well as with what we have termed the 
Table 2. Possible Explanations for the Co-occurrence of Two 
or more Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders 
Both Disorders are Reflection of the Same Phenomenon  
1. Both conditions are reflections of the same phenomenon.  
2. One of the two conditions is a mere reflection of the other.  
3. One of the two induces changes that lead to the other. 
Common Factor for Both Disorders  
1. Vulnerability hypothesis. 
Artefact of Diagnostic Criteria  
1. Comorbidity due to overlapping criteria.  
2. Comorbidity due to one disorder encompassing the other. 
The Comorbid Disorders are Two Separate Entities  
1. They can be either one or the other.  
2. They may appear together (comorbidity viewpoint).  
3. Each can appear at threshold or subthreshold level. Any combination 
is possible (mixture subsyndromal viewpoint).  
4. Comorbidity is a common final pathway of two distinct conditions. 
Adapted from Klein and Riso (22). 
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separation anxiety spectrum [37], and derealisa-
tion/depersonalization symptoms [38, 39]. 
Potential uses for the spectrum approach may include the 
improvement of treatment selection, development of better 
strategies for outcomes measurement, monitoring the course 
of illnesses, strengthening of therapeutic alliances, and im-
provement in subtyping of patients for clinical, biological, 
and genetic research [40]. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT AND  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
In spite of general awareness that the term ‘comorbidity’ 
is a straining word for the clinician, conceptually, it is still 
clearly important in patient management and treatment. Fail-
ure to classify and analyze comorbid disease can create mis-
leading clinical statistics and may cause spurious compari-
sons during the planning and evaluation of treatment for pa-
tients. Comorbidity can alter the clinical course of patients 
with the same diagnosis by affecting the time of detection, 
prognostic anticipations, therapeutic selection, and post-
therapeutic outcome of an index diagnosis. Also, the pres-
ence of soft signs and symptoms belonging to the spectrum 
of other disorders (observed over a lifetime) if systematically 
overlooked, may lead to a bias in selecting an appropriate 
treatment strategy. For example, in a hypothetical trial for an 
anti-panic medication, a panic patient, who has obsessive 
symptoms but lacks one symptom to fulfil the criteria for 
OCD, is included in the trials as well as a patient without 
obsessive traits. Practical consequences may include poor 
knowledge about the spectrum of action of the treatment, 
difficulty in predicting response to the treatment, and/or 
atypical outcomes. 
The DSM-IV does not suggest specific treatments for 
each disorder category and subcategory. However, modern 
treatment researchers—psychosocial and psychopharmaco-
logical—have attempted to design treatments tailored to spe-
cific DSM categories. The strategy links treatment to diag-
nosis, and we may expect this strategy to succeed to the ex-
tent that the targeted DSM-IV classification is valid. It is 
possible that treatment researchers will successfully design 
treatments that fit DSM-IV categories but fail to treat their 
patients successfully because the categories do not com-
pletely represent the patients. To the extent that comorbidity 
presents a challenge to the official nomenclature, it presents 
a similar challenge to treatments designed and targeted for 
DSM categories. 
Clinicians who seek only the diagnostic criteria for a spe-
cific disorder, with rigid adherence to the DSM-IV diagnos-
tic criteria, and by extension, the DSM-IV categories, will 
probably miss a more global perspective of the entire pathol-
ogy. Such a narrow perspective is mainly justified in re-
search, but is unacceptable in clinical practice. The DSM-IV 
was conceived, at least in part, as a research tool, allowing 
common, standardized, and atheoretical communication 
among clinical investigators. But the DSM-IV is also used as 
a clinical manual when the practitioner is face to face with 
the patient. A more integrative approach that takes comor-
bidity into account should not only reflect a more valid psy-
chiatric classification, but should also improve treatment and 
treatment outcome. 
Evidence for the dramatic intrusion of comorbidity phe-
nomena (axis I and spectrum comorbidity) in psychiatry has 
been derived from several sources, including epidemiologi-
cal, pharmacological, clinical, and genetic studies. Despite 
this broad body of evidence, proponents of the categorical 
approach do not take into account subclinical symptomatol-
ogy that coexists with the disorder, overlooking the complex 
degree of mixture among the different symptoms [41].   
We have discussed the diagnostic improvement brought 
about by the punctual and refined recognition of subclinical 
and atypical comorbidity. Another relevant consequence 
involves therapeutic strategy, as comorbid syndromes often 
require different acute, continuation, and maintenance doses 
as well as a distinct timing of administration and suspension 
of the treatment. It is not difficult to believe that drug targets 
in the brain are different in different patients; for example, a 
patient with a pure disorder compared to a patient with the 
same disorder plus spectrum symptoms of panic and/or ob-
sessive-compulsive disorder. However, official guidelines 
for the therapy of depression and bipolar disorders still do 
not provide clinicians and researchers with any treatment-
specific indications, devoting relatively little attention to the 
clinical importance of comorbidity, treatment strategies, and 
outcome. Also, the reliability of clinical trials can be ques-
tioned in light of a more descriptive approach as pharmacol-
ogical trials are usually conducted with patients whose 
symptomatology fits a particular diagnosis coded by stan-
dardized criteria. 
Diagnostic procedures should attempt to combine de-
scriptive, categorical and dimensional approaches, address-
ing more attention to the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
analysis of nuclear, subclinical, and atypical symptoms that 
may represent a pattern of full-blown and partially expressed 
comorbidity. Within this conceptual framework, psychopa-
thology can be more specifically approached in clinical 
terms of either individualized treatment or prevention. Fur-
thermore, some traditional points of weakness of clinical 
psychiatry and psychology, for example, chronic forms of 
illness and treatment-resistant depressions, may be con-
trasted more successfully. 
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